The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) concluded with a significant breakthrough that reflects over a year of sustained mobilisation by civil society constituencies: the advancement of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) into an implementation phase. Since the JTWP was formally adopted to the UNFCCC agenda, it carried a 2026 deadline. To contextualise, over the past two years, Parties engaged in four dialogue sessions that examined the programme’s core thematic areas, including its integration into Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, just energy transitions, social protection and economic dimensions, workforce considerations, and social protection systems. These dialogues have concluded outcomes, but then what? Just transition needed an extension of its mandate beyond the deadline!
Negotiations on the JTWP intensified from the second day of COP30. Daily contact groups worked through the informal notes from the 62nd sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SB62) alongside the reports emerging from the third and fourth JTWP dialogues. Yet even in the final hours before the closing plenary, civil society organisations (CSOs) remained uncertain whether Parties would adopt the text establishing the JTWP mechanism, now referred to as the Belem Action Mechanism (BAM).
Across six contentious contact group sessions, the most difficult points of disagreement between developed and developing countries centred on Unilateral Trade Measures (UTM), the risk of reducing the JTWP to a set of technical “toolboxes,” and the push by some Parties to convert it into an action plan rather than an institutional structure. Not to mention the huge disagreement on the means of implementation, especially related to access to finance as well as technology transfer.
JTWP as a Battleground, Who Sneaks their responsibilities, Revealing Power dynamics at Plays in the negotiation Rooms:
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The Finance Battle: Typical Shifting Burdens? Who benefits?
If one thing became clear, it’s that COP30 was not the COP of bold truth, sneaking from responsibilities without even hiding behind rhetoric. This was extremely obvious throughout the JTWP negotiations, with many developing countries blocking progress on the means of implementation, such as finance, technology transfer, and capacity building, not to mention the diluting and resisting of establishing the Just Transition Mechanism. Moreover, reflecting back on this dynamic, it was manifested in the blocking by the EU and the UK as they were attempting to scrap 12 paragraphs of the Means of Implementation (MoI) and replace them with a single vague paragraph centred on “a variety of finance sources.” Needless to mention, they were blocking any references to the “Loss and Damage” fund in the preamble text.
Moreover, the UK and the EU were both strongest in deliberately deleting any obligation, diluting responsibilities, deleting most of the financial references and making it a voluntary basis. This was also apparent in the negotiations, in which they requested to delete references to Article 9.1, which anchors mandatory finance for developing countries, and opposed language linking finance to historical responsibility, attempting to oppose calls for grant-based finance for the just transition. In addition, the battle around finance was also heated in their attempts to replace the cluster of finance paragraphs (21–24) with a single vague sentence emphasising the variety of sources, instruments, and channels.
This is not only a technical disagreement between parties, but it is a clash over whether a just transition should redistribute resources, power, oppose all historical systems of capitalism and colonialism or just leave these inequalities untouched. The developing countries recognised this and mostly unified around one goal, in which their position shows an attempt to empty the JTWP of its means of implementation (transitioning without finance, without technology) is not a TRANSITION at all. This dynamic also manifests the classical attempts by Global North countries to shirk their historical responsibilities, defending their accumulated wealth through capitalist and colonialist systems.
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False Solution Dominance: What are the Manifestations in the Negotiations
False solutions have been a main topic in the room during JTWP negotiations in COP30 this year. Starting from the meanings and principles of Just transitions in Paragraph 12 of the text, this paragraph defines the principles of JTWP, and the principles define power. Starting from the vision of Global North countries that attempted to shape the transition by their own economics, trade measures where the responsibilities are diffused, and mitigation dominates the scene. Where Global South countries stood firm on a transition rooted in equity, development rights, and not limited to emissions. In addition, Global South countries also stood firm on just transition principles such as Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), equity, energy poverty, poverty eradication, calling out the false solutions in the impacts of UTM, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and keeping an eye on the need to support MoI. However, the opposition by both the UK and the EU opposed the strengthening of these principles and attempted to push just transition into a mitigation-centric framing, which the Arab Group called out as inaccurate and discriminatory.
Repeatedly calling out the false solutions in the negotiation rooms, the Arab Group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) negotiating blocs brought CBAM into the room not as a side topic but as a structural threat. Their concern: transition cannot be “just” if UTM restricts exports and undermines development pathways.
What are the main concerns, and why is CBAM considered a violation? Because if the CBDR-RC strengthened to ensure equity and historical responsibilities in the JTWP, then the EU’s CBAM would become harder to justify within the transition framework. In addition, CBAM and UTM are penalising developing countries that lack affordable green tech, failing the principle that developed nations should bear more responsibility. Needless to mention that the EU is weaponising climate action for trade advantage, this will result in shifting mitigation burdens onto the Global South.
False solutions have also manifested in the attempts to deny access to technology. For instance, Norway and the UK were both requesting the deletion of references to licensing, patent pools, open standards, and technology transfer. This blocking happens without any efficient argument, yet they were just protecting their “intellectual property regimes” that keep developing countries dependent on the Global North’s technology. This reflects and sustains white supremacy in maintaining power and control over technological pathways that ultimately enhance the white ideology to control any fair transfer and any right for self-determination to Global South countries.
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Despite the white Blocking, the Global South remains unified.
One of the positive outcomes in the JTWP negotiations at this COP was the unification of Global South countries; it was obvious that the unification in G77+China led by Egypt, LMDC, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Arab Group bloc. Observing the unification, tactics, and strategies was inspiring compared to what I observed in the past JTWP negotiations over the past two years for both SBs and COPs.
Through analysing their interventions and power in the negotiations, the majority of them were prioritising sets of implementation, anchoring what JTWP manifested as material support, equity and fair play, development protection, institutional capacity, right for self-determination, moving towards implementation through mechanisms, and CBD-RC. This was manifested in the insistence and consistency of the Global South countries like LMDC, Cuba, and the Arab Group around MoI. For instance, LMDC called out the absence around Article 9.1 obligations as a “fundamental gap,” rejecting blended finance as a substitute for concessional finance, Cuba rejecting any compromises around the MoI language, and the Arab Group insisting on the historical responsibilities of developed countries and reflecting this in the MoI language. Their unity here is procedural and existential: it converts normative demands into enforceable resource flows. Even though the final text still needs lots of work around the finance flows of JTWP, this unity was a good sign in the room.
In addition to their unification around the institutionalisation of the JT mechanism, G77+China, LMDC, AOSIS, Arab Group, and other countries like Tanzania, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, amongst others, were consistently affirming the implementation of the Mechanism, not accepting any dilution into action plans or toolbox, insisting it should also have a clear plan for stakeholders’ input. Their Global South unification also extended into the protection of their economies from UTM and the CBAM by collectively demanding safeguards and arguing that the mechanisms are a threat to the convention principles and to the national trade sector. Moreover, Egypt, Botswana and others pushed language to minimise adverse cross-border socio-economic impacts, referencing the Convention and Kyoto protocol. This unification has also shed its boundaries and provided a shield to protect their vulnerable economies from external measures that threaten their industrialisation and/or revenue loss, or even create more burdens in the transition. Finally, unification around MoI and the JTWP Mechanism rejects a false solution that collectively harms their economies and addresses any potential shifting of responsibilities from North to South. If this unification continues, it will create a burden for the Northern country blocks against their false solutions and sneaking away from historical responsibilities.
BAM Came to Life: Revealing the Advocacy by CSOs for the Mechanism:
Civil society’s push for a JTWP mechanism began early in 2025. Constituencies such as the Women and Gender Constituency (WGC), together with other rights-holder groups like the Climate Action Network (CAN), the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ), and the Trade Union Non-Government Organisations (TUNGO), collectively developed the proposal for a Just Transition Mechanism, envisioned as a way to shift the JTWP from dialogues to implementation beyond the deadline in 2026. The first visible moment of mobilisation around this idea occurred during the Bonn SB62 session in June 2025, when the CSOs observer constituencies came into agreement on the theorisation of the Just Transition Mechanism.
Developing the concept required extensive research and coordination. WGC initiated the first draft of the proposal, followed by numerous bilateral discussions among constituencies to refine a version aligned with each group’s priorities. During SB62, advocacy efforts focused heavily on Global South negotiating blocs, including G77+China, AOSIS, LMDCs, the African Group and LDCs. Through my work with WGC, we also held targeted bilaterals with major Global North blocs such as the EU and the UK. Over ten days of negotiations and contact groups, we increasingly saw the term “mechanism” appear in interventions from Global South Parties, signalling that the proposal was gaining traction.
However, SB62 closed without a negotiated text, leaving only an informal note. Key disagreements persisted around references to fossil fuel phase-out, unilateral trade measures, and the inclusion of gender and human rights language.